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Abstract 
Protecting intellectual property contained in application source code and 
preventing tampering with application binaries are both major concerns for software 
developers.  Simply by possessing an application binary, any user is able to attempt to 
reverse engineer valuable information or produce unanticipated execution results through 
tampering.  As reverse engineering tools become more prevalent, and as the knowledge 
required to effectively use those tools decreases, applications come under increased 
attack from malicious users.  
 Emerging development tools such as Microsoft's .NET Application Framework 
allow diverse source code composed of multiple programming languages to be integrated 
into a single application binary, but the potential for theft of intellectual property 
increases due to the metadata-rich construction of compiled .NET binaries.  Microsoft's 
new Software Licensing and Protection Services (SLPS) application is designed to 
mitigate trivial reversing of .NET applications through the use of virtualization.  This 
research investigates the viability of the SLPS software protection utility Code Protector 
as a means of mitigating the inherent vulnerabilities of .NET applications.  
 The results of the research show that Code Protector does indeed protect compiled 
.NET applications from reversing attempts using commonly-available tools.  While the 
performance of protected applications can suffer if the protections are applied to sections 
of the code that are used repeatedly, it is clear that low-use .NET application code can be 
protected by Code Protector with little performance impact.
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MITIGATING REVERSING VULNERABILITIES IN .NET APPLICATIONS 
 
USING VIRTUALIZED SOFTWARE PROTECTION  
 
 
I.  Introduction 
1.1 Background  
 The protection of the intellectual property (IP) contained within software 
applications has long been a concern of software developers.  As reverse engineering 
tools and knowledge become more commonplace in the information technology 
community, gaining knowledge about an application (either for the purpose of IP theft or 
exploiting vulnerabilities in the application) becomes a much simpler process that 
requires much less sophistication on the part of the attacker.  Therefore, traditional 
software protections are quickly being replaced by more advanced protection schemes to 
make software reversing more difficult.  One such emerging protection scheme is the use 
of virtual machines to protect the IP contained within software applications. 
 To further complicate the protection of intellectual property, many software 
developers use new technologies for application development that allow for high 
interoperability between software components (even components developed in different 
programming languages).  One such technology is Microsoft's .NET application 
framework.  The .NET framework, while very useful in terms of portability and 
simplicity, is extremely vulnerable to IP theft because of the large amount of information 
contained in .NET binaries. 
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 To mitigate the vulnerabilities in the .NET framework, Microsoft has recently 
developed a protection scheme called Microsoft Software Licensing and Protection 
Services (SLPS).  This system uses virtualized software protections to secure developer-
specified areas of an already created .NET application [16]. 
 
1.2 Research Goals 
 The goal of this research is to examine the protections applied to .NET 
applications by SLPS and determine if they successfully mitigate the specific weakness 
of .NET applications in the area of intellectual property theft and reverse engineering.  To 
successfully protect a .NET application, these protections must successfully defend 
against attacks from common reversing tools and .NET analysis tools. 
 
 1.2.1. Develop Test Application and Apply Software Protection. To test the 
protections applied by the SLPS, a test application is developed using the .NET 
application framework.  This application contains a reverse engineering target in the form 
of an algorithm that will simulate intellectual property contained within a production 
.NET application.  Once the test application is developed, the SLPS system protects the 
simulated IP “target” embedded in the test application. 
 
 1.2.2. Perform Red Team Analysis. Once an application is protected with a 
specific software protection, reverse engineering techniques and tools are applied to the 
application binary to subvert the protections and access the guarded intellectual property 
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that originated from the program source.  This research employs a broad spectrum of 
reverse engineering and red-teaming techniques to crack the software protections placed 
on the test application by the SLPS. 
 
 1.2.3 Analyze Attack Results and Application Performance. Finally, this research 
determines both the strengths and weaknesses of the virtualized protections in the test 
application and the performance impact that these protections have on the application.  
The relative strength of the protections is difficult to quantify (especially since its 
observation depends on the skill of the reverser), but this research examines the impact of 
the virtualized protections on the test application to determine if the protections are 
usable in a production software application. 
 
1.3 Document Preview 
 Chapter 2 examines reverse engineering techniques and tools.  Chapter 3 outlines 
the experimental methodology used to examine virtualized software protection for .NET 
applications.  Chapter 4 provides a description and analysis of the experimental results 
with specific focus on attacks made against the protection system and information 
gathered.  Chapter 5 provides a summary of experimental findings as well as future 
research in the area of virtualized software protections. 
 
 
II. Reverse Engineering and Virtualization Background 
2.1 Overview 
   This chapter describes the most common types of software tools and techniques 
in use by software reversers today – debuggers, disassemblers, and decompilers.  
Additional consideration is given to a separate class of tools, called deobfuscators, which 
are used to specifically defeat virtualization or obfuscation protections.  This chapter also 
discusses several common software protection schemes and tools used to defeat reverse 
engineering tools.  Finally, this chapter presents an overview of virtualization as a 
technology, specifically as realized in the Microsoft .NET application framework as a 
mechanism for software protection; it also discusses the current state of attack 
methodologies for defeating virtualized software protections. 
 
2.2 Reverse Engineering Tools and Techniques 
 2.2.1. Debuggers. Debugging is the process of viewing the current state of a 
program while it is executing, viewing the program data at a given execution state, and 
tracing through the program's execution.  This process is controlled through the use of a 
program called a debugger.  For reversers, debuggers are powerful tools that allow them 
to observe a program's execution step-by-step to identify critical sections of the reversing 
target.  
 Common techniques used by debugging tools include execution breakpoints and 
the ability to trace the control flow of an application.  Execution breakpoints allow the 
debugger to suspend execution at particular locations of interest in the application 
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instructions.  Breakpoints can be set by using INT3 interrupt instructions to replace the 
true application instruction at the point where the user wishes to suspend execution and 
replacing the breakpoint code with the original instruction once the processor interrupts 
and returns control back to the debugger.  Some processors also have the ability to 
suspend program execution once a certain memory addressed is accessed; these are called 
hardware breakpoints, and there are a limited number of these resource available to the 
CPU  [9]. 
 
 2.2.2. Disassemblers.  Disassemblers are essentially translators that 
convert byte code into human-readable assembly instructions.  The process of 
interpreting code is a relatively simple parsing problem that maps processor machine 
code to specific assembly instructions (e.g., a hex 90 is equal to a NOP instruction for 
x86 processors).  The complexity in disassembly lies differentiating between code and 
data in the program executable  [9]. 
 To properly decode x86 instructions, disassemblers typically approach the 
problem of interpreting the bytes of an executable using one of three methods.  Linear 
sweep disassemblers pass through the code to determine instructions based on their 
starting opcode and instruction length (byte boundary of the instruction).  Recursive 
traversal disassemblers use the targets of control branches to identify instructions to be 
disassembled and recursively descend through the control structures of a program to 
decode the instructions.  Finally, dynamic disassemblers assemble the code as the 
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program executes, using methods similar to the recursive traversal disassembler in 
conjunction with additional tools, such as a debugger [9]. 
 
 2.2.3. Decompilers. Decompilers do precisely what their name suggests– 
reverse the process of compiling source code to executable code.  The goal of a 
decompiler is to convert the low-level processor instructions into a disassembled 
executable file in a high-level language.  However, because high-level instructions do not 
necessarily map one-to-one to low-level instructions, decompilers sometimes produce 
high-level code that is functionally equivalent to the original but is comprised of a 
different set of high-level instructions.  This loss of information is due largely to the fact 
that most compilers will omit certain information found in high-level code (e.g., 
comments, function names, and constant definitions) for the purpose of optimization [9].  
Additionally, the problem of functional equivalence is compounded by the fact that there 
are usually multiple ways to approach one problem; the expressions in Figure 2.1 
evaluate to the same value but their complexity differs greatly. 
 
  (A) ( x + 5 ) / y 
  (B) [ ( y * x ) * ( 1 / y^2 ) ] + ( 5 / y ) 
  
Figure 2.1: Equivalent Expressions of Differing Complexity 
 
 If the compiler optimizes the instruction code that is generated, the second 
expression may be reduced to look similar (if not identical) to the first.  This type of 
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problem also surfaces when equivalent language constructs are used.  For example, the 
two equivalent Java segments (A) and (B) shown below in Figure 2.2 will have the 
same result when interpreted by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM), but no information is 
included in the low-level code that would allow a decompiler to reconstruct exactly 
which version was used in the original high-level code  [12]. 
 
  (A)   
   { 
   if ( x < y ) { return true; }  
   else { return false; } 
   } 
   (B)  
    { 
    return ( x < y ? true : false ); 
    } 
 
Figure 2.2: Equivalent Code Blocks Performing Identical Tasks 
 
 2.2.4. Deobfuscators.  There are a number of tools available to developers 
to protect their code through various obfuscation techniques (which is discussed in 
Section 2.3.2).  Some deobfuscation tools attempt to reverse the transformations that have 
been applied to application code to make the code harder to reverse. 
 Deobfuscators attempt to return obfuscated code to a reduced size executable that 
has all unnecessary code removed.  Because automated obfuscation tools often introduce 
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large amounts of unnecessary complexity to the program code, it is possible in some 
cases to use static analysis tools to identify and remove sections of obfuscated code [9]. 
 
2.3 Software Protection (Anti-Reversing) 
 2.3.1. Common Anti-Reversing Techniques. Software developers employ a 
number of techniques to prevent reversers from understanding or tampering with their 
program code.  To defeat code replacement and assembly modifications of the program, 
checksums ensure the integrity of certain code sections [4, 9].  Debuggers are also 
detected using API calls such as the Win32 isDebuggerPresent() call; typically a program 
that detects a debugger in this way will terminate, follow an alternate control path 
through the code that generates incorrect output, or possibly attempt to interfere with the 
operation of the debugger software.  To confuse reversers, it is also possible to remove or 
mangle the symbolic information in an executable.  This technique makes understanding 
the structure and purpose of the application difficult for reversers who are reversing the 
code by hand rather than using an automated tool [9]. 
 
 2.3.2. Obfuscation. In contrast to the anti-reversing techniques described in 
Section 2.3.1, obfuscation is a set of techniques that hides the true functionality of an 
application rather than attempting to prevent or detect the use of reversing tools.  There 
are many ways to make a program more complex (and consequently more difficult to 
reverse).  Executables can be partially or completely encrypted.  This makes reversing 
very difficult and can force the reverser to intercept the encryption key or somehow 
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obtain a decrypted form of the program code.  The symbolic data stored in the executable 
code (e.g., function names) can be removed to confuse the reverser.  Additionally, code 
can be obfuscated by rearranging the sequence of instructions or how program data is 
stored [9].  Program control flow can be obfuscated by several different types of code 
transforms as well, both static and dynamic [4, 8]. 
 
 2.3.3. Automated Protection Tools. There are numerous automated protection 
utilities available in the area of software protection.  The method of protection varies by 
product, but each of these protection schemes delivers powerful software protection that 
is easy to use to protect vulnerable applications.  Aladdin's HASP HL product uses a 
combination of encryption and a hardware key to protect applications and decrypt them at 
runtime [1].  ArXan's EnforcIT uses configurable software protections applied to certain 
areas of the application code by software developers [3].  Additionally, there are a 
number of virtualized software protections, such as VMProtect, WinLicense, and the 
recently-released Microsoft Software Licensing and Protection Services (SLPS), that use 
virtual machines to obfuscate applications [16, 17, 20].  All of these products are 
relatively new to the area of software protection but are largely unverified with respect to 
the degree of protection they provide. 
2.4 Virtualization 
 2.4.1. Overview of Virtualization and Virtual Machines. Virtual machines are 
software applications that allow the execution of software in an environment separate 
from the host operating environment.  Virtual machines are processor-specific due to 
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their reliance on the host environment to provide the CPU and hardware functions 
necessary to operate, but the applications that are executed within the virtual machine are 
not limited to one execution platform.  Applications that are executed by virtual machines 
enjoy several benefits that native applications do not have.  Because virtual machines 
handle architecture-specific details of program execution, applications can run on 
multiple computing platforms if there is a suitable virtual machine that can run the 
application.  This makes virtual machines ideal for resolving application portability 
problems.  Applications that are executed by a virtual machine also benefit from 
additional safety and performance benefits that are not always attainable when an 
application is executing directly on the host system [9]. 
 Some virtual machines, such as Microsoft's .NET framework or Sun 
Microsystems’ JVM, use a separate instruction encoding scheme from that of the host 
architecture.  This separate instruction set requires that the virtual machine emulate the 
instruction execution or translate the instructions to a form that can be executed by the 
host architecture [12, 14]. 
 Current operating system virtualization technology makes use of an intermediary 
software application between the host system hardware and the applications running in a 
virtual machine.  This software is typically called the hypervisor or Virtual Machine 
Manager (VMM).   The hypervisor provides an interface to the applications running 
inside the virtual machine that emulates the underlying hardware for which those 
applications were compiled.  Hypervisors can manage multiple virtual machines 
concurrently, allowing multiple applications or operating systems to run on a single 
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system by placing them each within their own virtual machine.  When operating from 
within a virtual machine, the guest software or operating system has full access to all 
resources of the system and the hypervisor manages problems such as scheduling and I/O 
device management [6].   
 Hypervisors may manage virtual machines using emulated virtualization or 
paravirtualization.  Emulated virtualization fully emulates the guest system's target 
architecture in the hypervisor's software.  Paravirtualization presents an abstraction of the 
underlying hardware to the guest applications.  This strategy requires that the guest 
software be specially written to cooperate with the hypervisor, but this approach to 
virtualization can improve performance over an emulated virtualization environment [6]. 
 
 2.4.2. Microsoft .NET Application Framework. One specific virtualization 
application is the Microsoft .NET application framework.  While the .NET framework is 
not a pure virtual machine because its execution is integrated tightly with the underlying 
Microsoft operating system (which is the only fully-supported computing platform for 
.NET) [14], the runtime application for .NET appears to developers as a virtual machine; 
this allows multiple development languages to be written for the .NET Common 
Language Runtime (CLR) without considering the specific platform on which the .NET 
framework is executing.  The .NET application framework contains numerous 
development libraries with code solutions that developers can use in their application 
development, and .NET abstracts the application development process to a level where 
developers need not consider operating system tasks such as memory management [14]. 
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 Applications developed using .NET are converted from their original source 
language to an intermediary form, known as the Microsoft Intermediary Language 
(MSIL), that is compatible with the Common Language Infrastructure (CLI) which is 
Microsoft's standard describing the .NET application code, executing environment, and 
rules which comprise the .NET runtime, type system, metadata specifications, and 
execution rules [10].  The CLR interprets the CLI-compatible code, which is said to be in 
Common Intermediary Language (CIL) form, and executes it on the host system.  
According to the Microsoft .NET application framework standard, all implementations of 
.NET CLR must also contain a Virtual Execution System (VES) that translates the CIL 
instructions into machine language when the program is executed on a .NET host system.  
Previous attempts to protect .NET applications have largely been confined to performing 
metadata obfuscation or directly obfuscating the MSIL code [19]. 
  
 Section 2.4.3. Using Virtualization as Software Protection.  Virtualization 
and virtual machine instruction sets have traditionally been used as a means to isolate the 
operation of applications and remove them from directly executing on the host system.   
Virtual machines have recently been used as a means to obfuscate application code [2, 
11].  Because the instruction codes of a virtual machine can be different than the 
traditional host architecture’s instruction set, it can be challenging to hand-reverse an 
application that has been obfuscated in this manner.  Additionally, virtualized software 
protection can further frustrate reversers’ attacks by changing the translation rules 
between virtual machine and host operating system each time the protection is employed, 
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meaning that an opcode will not necessarily have a consistent meaning across multiple 
protected applications or even throughout the execution of a single application [5, 16, 
17]. 
 Virtualization is also suggested to be a suitable means of protecting applications 
from reusable reversing attacks.  Under normal distribution models, any distributed 
binaries of an application that has been successfully reversed are vulnerable to reversing 
in a similar manner.  Virtualization can therefore introduce diversity into the application 
distribution process and generate different versions of the same application binary that 
are theoretically not vulnerable to the same attacks [2]. 
 
2.5 Attack Methodologies 
 Virtual software protections can present a difficult challenge to reversers.  In 
some cases it is possible to subvert the virtual machine mechanism by hooking the virtual 
machine's instruction decoding process or calculating where the virtual machine will 
execute its next instructions.  In cases where direct subversion of the virtual machine is 
not possible, reversers can attack the virtual machine through instruction decoding or 
through observing the side effects of virtual machine instructions and mapping them to 
true x86 assembly code.  Even if a virtual machine is not well protected, it still serves to 
add an additional layer of obfuscation onto the assembly instructions of an application.  
By contrast, a well-protected virtual machine with a great deal of complexity is a true 
reversing challenge to defeat [5, 13, 18]. 
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2.6 Summary 
 This chapter describes the current state of reverse-engineering tools and 
techniques and the protections that are commonly used to thwart reversing efforts.  
Additionally, this chapter describes the technology of virtualization and investigates the 
potential of virtualization as a software protection mechanism.  Although virtualized 
software protection is still in its infancy and strategies for defeating virtualized 
protections have not been well-investigated or tested, this chapter describes the current 
attack methodologies available to reversers to attack virtualized protection systems.
 
III. Experimental Methodology 
3.1 Overview 
 As software reverse engineering tools and knowledge continue to become 
increasingly available, code protection techniques have also become more sophisticated 
and more commonly employed [9].  Despite these advances in protection, many 
organizations have a vested interest in retaining the ability to successfully reverse 
engineer and understand the functionality and structure of specialized code that has been 
protected or obfuscated.  An emerging technology in the area of software protection is 
virtualized software protections – software that is protected by transforming the normal 
instruction set and wrapping the executable code in a virtual machine that executes the 
transformed instructions.  Because virtualized software protections are still in their 
infancy and formal methods for analyzing virtualized protections are still rudimentary, 
reversing code that has been protected in this fashion is often left solely to the skill and 
intuition of the individual reverser. 
 To further complicate matters, virtual machines can protect software by changing 
the appearance or structure of the code due to the transformation of the instruction set and 
execution of protected instructions within the framework of a virtual machine [9].  
Defeating these types of protections often requires extensive amounts of time and effort 
and can be extremely tedious to perform.  While common reverse engineering tools, such 
as IDAPro or OllyDbg, give reversers a great deal of  insight into the nature of most 
program code, virtualized protections often limit the usefulness of these tools as avenues 
to attack or reverse a piece of code.  Because of this limitation in current reversing 
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technologies, a tool or process that analyzes a virtual code protection scheme and assists 
reversers in planning their attacks on such programs would be highly beneficial.  
Alternatively, such a tool could also be used by software engineers to evaluate the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of a virtualized protection scheme. 
 
3.2 Problem Definition 
3.2.1 Goals and Hypothesis. The purpose of this research effort is to develop a 
means to evaluate the effectiveness of a virtual software protection scheme.  This 
methodology can aid reversers in attacking or understanding virtualized code and assist 
software engineers in understanding the relative strengths and weaknesses of virtualized 
software protections they have applied to their code.  Virtualized code is difficult for both 
software tools and human beings to understand, so it would be advantageous if the 
application of formal protection analysis could be used to determine the effectiveness of a 
virtual protection or remove some of the obfuscation from a piece of code.   
 To better understand program code that is protected by virtual software 
protections, the analysis strategy created as a result of this research effort must attempt to 
show either that the application's protections can be subverted or that they cannot.  While 
this determination is restricted to include only examinations made based on the skill and 
experience of the individual reverser, it can be repeated by different classes of reversing 
adversaries.  This research therefore develops analysis methodologies to successfully 
evaluate the level of protection provided by obfuscated code and therefore increase the 
understanding of that code. 
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 3.2.2 Approach. To better enable reversers to effectively evaluate protected 
code, it is necessary to understand the nature of virtual protection.  Using detailed 
knowledge of virtualized obfuscation techniques, an established virtualization protection 
system called the Microsoft Software Licensing and Protection System (SLPS) is used to 
apply protections to test applications.  These applications are evaluated by common 
reversing tools and techniques to determine the strengths of their protection schemes.  By 
attempting to subvert the applied protection scheme and analyzing the degree of 
protection it provides, the test methodology is able to produce a determination of the 
effectiveness of a protection scheme in preventing the researcher’s reversing efforts.  The 
SLPS is selected as the protection system for this research effort due to its claim of 
satisfying Anckaert's requirement of “diversity” to prevent attack replication [2] and its 
claim to secure .NET applications [16]. 
 
3.3 System Boundaries 
 Because the effectiveness of a protection scheme is being tested, the system under 
test (SUT) is a software reversing system.  The system includes computer hardware and 
an operating system to serve as a platform for testing, a set of disassembler/debugger 
tools for use in evaluating the software to be reversed, an attack methodology for 
attempting to reverse virtual code protections, and a set of protected application code for 
use in software protection.  The set of tools is composed of OllyDbg, IDAPro, and .NET 
Reflector and its plugins. 
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 The protected test application code of the software reversing system is the focus 
of this research effort and is the component under test (CUT).  This research evaluates the 
specified protection as applied to the CUT and attempts determine the effectiveness of 
the protection scheme, so the SUT will provide a framework on which to build an 
evaluation of the CUT as a viable protection analysis tool.  The block diagram for the 
SUT and CUT is shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1: Software Reversing System 
 
3.4 System Services 
 The software reversing system takes a protected program executable and attempts 
to remove or subvert the virtualized software protections to the greatest extent possible so 
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that a reverser can evaluate the relative strength of the virtualized protection scheme used 
to apply those protections.  This process may not result in a perfectly decoded set of 
instructions, so the result may be a partially-protected executable or an executable which 
could not be reversed to any degree and is thus still protected (meaning that the attack 
methodology of the system has failed to reverse the software). 
Obviously there is a large degree of human interaction with the SUT to produce 
the system service, and that imperfect (and many times inconsistent) interaction with the 
other components is one of the motivations for defining a formal attack methodology.  
The intent of the system is to successfully defeat the protections provided by the virtual 
machine through the use of a reversing methodology and therefore generate a positive 
system result from the specific protection being tested.  Specifically, the CUT is a set of 
protected instructions as the system response; the defined metrics measure the number of 
instructions that are decoded correctly versus incorrectly (when compared with the 
unprotected workload executable’s instructions), the time required to decode these 
instructions, and the number of attempts required to search the instruction set space. 
 The CUT is a particular test application called “FractalAttack” written for the 
purpose of simulating a scientific application with algorithms containing some IP 
protected by SLPS.  This application is written in C# and is compiled as a .NET 
application binary.  The application is centered around the generation and display of 
Heighway-Dragon (HD) fractals.  HD fractals are a series of line segments that are 
calculated based on the existing segments in the fractal.  The test application uses HD 
fractals because it is a simple matter to implement an HD fractal generator and because 
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HD fractal generation and display is computationally intensive at high degrees.  The 
fractal can be iteratively constructed as a series of left or right turns using the algorithm 
described in Figure 3.2. 
 
  Heighway-Dragon Fractal Calculation 
 
  Fractal of degree i (positive integer) 
  Assume the base value of “sequence” is empty  
  Let: sequence' denote the inversion of sequence  
      (e.g. R switches to L, L switches to R)  
 
   for each i  
      let sequence = sequence + “R” + sequence' 
 
  Example: first 4 iterations of an HD fractal 
  D1: R 
  D2: RRL 
  D3: RRLRLLR 
  D4: RRLRLLRRLLRLRRL 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Heighway-Dragon Fractal Calculation Algorithm 
 
 When represented graphically, the HD fractal forms a fractal curve whose number 
of line segments increases geometrically for each successive degree.  The fractal can be 
described solely by the fractal degree and the starting orientation of the first line segment, 
after which all successive turns and new line segments may be calculated using the 
algorithm in Figure 3.2.   
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3.5 Workload 
 The workload for the software reversing system is the virtual protection scheme 
that is obfuscating the executable, the set of parameters to specify the configuration of the 
virtualized protection, and the virtual machine that executes the protected application 
code.  The protection scheme will include a set of instructions that map to normal x86 or 
CIL execution instructions and an execution command string that specifies input 
parameters.  This greatly narrows the research scope to attack methodologies for a 
specific protection type but limits the usefulness of the finalized methodology in that it 
may only apply to the SLPS protection system.   
Because the protection scheme of the executable is virtualized and because the 
protection will be applied in the same way to any application given as input, a single 
unprotected set of executable instructions can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
software reversing system.  The protection scheme will not behave differently with 
different sets of unprotected code [15, 16].  This allows attacks against the virtual 
protection to be quickly tested and evaluated for performance since the executable 
remains constant.  The specific techniques that are used in attempting to defeat the virtual 
protections are a combination of brute-force attacking, control flow analysis, instruction 
set mapping, automated deobfuscation, and instruction observation at the operating 
system level [5, 13].  These techniques are commonly employed in attempts to reverse 
engineer software protection systems [9]. 
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3.6 Performance Metrics 
 The primary metrics for evaluating the effectiveness of a virtual protection are the 
number of program instructions that the reversing methodology can correctly identify and 
the time required for the analysis to succeed or fail.  These metrics measure in some 
sense the effectiveness of the attack methodology.  A more effective attack strategy 
should generate an executable with a greater number of unprotected instructions and a 
faster break time than will an ad hoc attack strategy.   
 The time that the attack methodology requires is of some interest because it 
identifies a particularly difficult protection to defeat.  The time metric is not necessarily 
valid in every situation because of the complex randomized nature of certain virtual 
protections and because the time to defeat a protection will be largely dependent on the 
talent of the human reverser.  However, it gives an indication of the relative difficulty of 
defeating a given protection. 
 The number of instructions that are correctly identified is also of interest to the 
evaluation of a virtual protection because it indicates how well the virtual machine is able 
to disguise its protected application.  While it may be possible to decode single 
instructions because of irregularities in the protection scheme or just by pure luck, 
decoding large percentages of the code not only indicates that the attack methodology 
was able to bypass the protection on the executable, but it also indicates just how broad 
of an area of the executable was revealed by the reversing attempts targeted against the 
virtual machine. 
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3.7 Parameters 
 3.7.1 System. The system parameters for the reversing system include the 
computer hardware, operating system, unprotected executable code, and compiler of the 
platform being used to reverse an executable.  The computer hardware consists of a Dell 
Precision 650 workstation with dual Xeon 2.4 GHz processors and 2GB of RAM running 
Microsoft Windows XP Profession SP 2 as the operating system.  These parameters are 
fixed due to the decision to consider only reversing Windows executables, and the 
hardware follows as a parameter due to the use of the AT-SPI/AFIT computers as the test 
platforms.  The hardware should not affect the virtual machine instruction set decoding 
metrics because of the operating system’s provision of a layer of abstraction when 
interacting with the hardware devices.  The time metric could potentially be affected if 
the test is conducted on a different system.  The compiler is a Microsoft Visual Studio 
2005 C# compiler version 8.0.50727.762. 
 
 3.7.2 Workload. The workload parameters for the software reversing system 
are the virtual protection scheme that is used by SLPS to protect an executable, the 
configuration parameters of the SLPS protection system, and the specific generated 
virtual machine that is used to protect and execute the instructions.  The complexity of 
the virtual machine and the virtual protection scheme is determined largely by the way 
the executable is protected by the SLPS, although human interaction with the protection 
system determines which parts of the unprotected application should be secured.  In this 
case, the experiment has one specific lightweight virtual machine, one protection scheme 
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determined by the SLPS, and only one significant configuration for the SLPS 
configuration parameters. 
 
3.8 Evaluation Technique 
 Only a few commercial virtual protection options are available for use as 
protection tools [2, 6].  These protection systems are proprietary, and thus the instruction 
sets and information about the complexity of the protections are not readily available, 
although it may be possible to reverse engineering this information through careful 
observation of the virtual machines’ execution.  Because this experimental setup 
evaluates the strength of a software protection, the type and complexity of the virtual 
protection is a constant factor since the same protection scheme is used regardless of the 
specific application code protected. 
 The experimental configuration consists of an unprotected executable that  is 
generated from the combination of the Visual Studio C# compiler, the SLPS protection 
system and generated code protected by virtualization, one or more computer systems on 
which to install the experimental setup, and set of reversing tools and strategies for use in 
analyzing the protections.  The reverser will analyze and attack the executable protected 
with the virtual protection being tested.  After the reverser has completed or failed the 
attack, the executable is analyzed to measure experiment metrics.   
 The results can easily be validated by comparing the decoded instructions 
generated from the reversing tool to the actual unprotected instructions that were 
generated by the compiler.  In this way, it is easy to determine whether an attack 
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methodology was successfully able to decode the instruction set and therefore understand 
the protected code.  An instruction is considered successfully reversed if it is decoded and 
represented identically to its original unprotected form or represented in a functionally 
equivalent form that demonstrates understanding of the underlying algorithms used to 
create the original code. 
 
3.9 Experimental Design 
 A single-test experimental configuration is appropriate for this experiment, with 
the sole combination of virtual machine and protection scheme (realized in an individual 
protected executable that is based on the single unprotected executable) being the only 
protected executable tested.  Because reverse-engineering can be time consuming and 
tedious, it is often a pass/fail result depending on whether or not the protection scheme 
was able to be bypassed.  Further, because the protection scheme can be determined to be 
vulnerable by a single successful break of the protections, this experimental design does 
not require more than a single pass/fail experiment to determine metrics for a specific 
protection scheme.  The researcher is the sole reverser for the purposes of this research, 
but additional reversers would provide more descriptive bounds for the time metrics.  The 
protected executable must be extensively attacked to have any confidence about the 
effectiveness of the protection guarding it.  It is for this reason the experiments focus on 
the results of attacking a specific section of the executable to obtain data that is as 
accurate as possible. 
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3.10 Methodology Summary 
 In evaluating virtualized software protections, it is necessary to perform testing of 
the software reversing system and a specific configuration of the SLPS and its virtual 
machine to validate the strength of the protections applied to the code.  The system under 
test is the entire software reversing system (composed of the protected application code, 
human reverser, attack methodology, and reversing tools) and the component under test is 
protected application code realized in the form of a test executable that has been secured 
using virtualized protections.  System parameters include the operating system, the 
compiler used to create program executables, the protection system (SLPS in this 
experiment), and the basic computer hardware on which the operating system is running 
and the SUT will be evaluated.  The workload parameters are the virtual protection 
scheme employed by the protection system, the generated virtual machine that executes 
the protected code, and the configuration parameters used to generate the protected 
executable; all of which will affect the test framework’s ability to successfully attack the 
protected application.  The experiment is conducted by using any and all means available 
to attack the protected executable and attempt to successfully extract any useful 
information about the secure virtual machine, its execution, or the protected application.
 
IV. Analysis and Results 
4.1 Overview 
 This chapter describes the experimental results of this research.  Statistical 
techniques are used to analyze the performance data from the test application, and to 
draw conclusions about the data that is presented.  For the qualitative analysis of the 
software protections applied to the target application, simulated IP “objectives” are 
protected using SLPS and several commonly-available reversing tools are used to attack 
the protected binary and attempt to attack the tampering and reversing objectives. 
 
4.2 Qualitative Analysis of Reversing Efforts 
 4.2.1. Reversing Test Goals. Code Protector, a part of the Microsoft Software 
Licensing and Protection System (SLPS), is used to protect FractalAttack, a C# 
application compiled for the Microsoft .NET application framework.  FractalAttack is 
developed specifically to evaluate the ability of Code Protector to secure .NET 
applications.  It performs a computationally intense task (iteratively generating a fractal 
image in bitmap form) and use multi-threading to display progress updates during the 
rendering process.  These aspects of the application make it an ideal candidate to simulate 
a real-world scientific computing application. 
 The protection goal is to secure FractalAttack with the maximal set of Code 
Protector’s software protection capabilities.  The strength of these protections is tested 
using commonly-available reversing tools, several of which are specifically for reversing 
.NET applications. 
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 The protections applied to the executable by SLPS are targeted to two specific 
program methods within the FractalAttack application.  First, a single method that 
contains a hard-coded numeric limitation on the maximum number of iterations of the 
fractal generation algorithm is protected.  This method tests the effectiveness of Code 
Protector against reverse engineering and tampering objectives.  Second, the critical 
algorithms of FractalAttack that actually calculate the starting orientation of the fractal 
curve are protected to simulate a scientific computing IP protection scenario. 
 
 4.2.2. Protection Tool. Code Protector is a virtual machine-based software 
protection developed as a part of SLPS, Microsoft’s newly-released license management 
and software protection solution for .NET applications.  The goal of Code Protector is to 
prevent .NET applications from being disassembled/decompiled.  This is challenging 
since the Common Language Runtime (CLR) environment that executes .NET 
applications uses an intermediate language from which it is possible to extract a great 
deal of metadata thereby allowing accurate reconstruction of the original source code.  
Code Protector attempts to mitigate the openness of the .NET application source by 
transforming code in Microsoft’s Secure Virtual Machine Language (SVML) and then 
executing the protected code using the Microsoft Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) 
operating on the CLR platform.  Code Protector uses a permutation transform system so 
each customer to receive a unique version of the SVML.  This theoretically makes Code 
Protector’s software protections more secure.  If one version of the SVML is 
compromised, the others are unaffected due to differences between versions [16]. 
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 Although the Code Protector software requires .NET 3.0 to execute properly, the 
documentation and configuration options indicate that target executables must be .NET 
binaries or DLLs using version 1.1.4322 or 2.0.50727 of the .NET framework.  
Additionally, three DLLs are created during the protection process.  These DLLs must be 
present in the same directory for the protected application to execute properly.  The DLLs 
are bundled with the test application and are listed below: 
 
• Microsoft.Licensing.Runtime2.0.dll 
• Microsoft.Licensing.Utils2.0.dll 
• Microsoft.Licensing.Permutation_1cc06_2.0.dll 
 
 Note that the “1cc06” piece of the permutation reflects the key value of the 
specific permutation that was used to protect the application (this is observed to be the 
first five digits of the permutation code, although this DLL naming convention is not 
documented anywhere in Microsoft’s literature). 
 Code Protector also imposes a number of restrictions on which language 
constructs can be used in the source code of a protected application.  These constructs are 
disallowed: 
 
• Methods within generic classes 
• Pure 64-bit executable code 
(code must be x86 flagged or use Windows on Windows3) 
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• Methods containing explicit instantiations of generic types 
• Methods with generic parameters 
• Non-static methods of a structure 
• Methods with “out” or “ref” parameters 
• Methods that invoke other methods with “out” or “ref” parameters (C# 
reference passing or output parameters) 
• Methods that modify any method parameter by reference 
• Methods with a variable number of parameters (e.g., using the 
“params” keyword in C#) 
• Methods with too many local variables or parameters (> 254). 
• Methods that contain calls to 
Reflection.Assembly.GetExecutingAssembly(), 
Reflection.MethodInfo.GetCurrentMethod(), or 
Reflection.Assembly.GetCallingAssembly(). 
• CLR 1.1 Framework only: Methods that create objects using 
constructors that have a variable number of parameters. This 
restriction does not exist when a non-constructor method is invoked. 
• Implicit and explicit cast operators cannot be transformed to the 
Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) 
• Unsafe code – For example, in C#, methods that contain the keyword 
unsafe typically cannot be transformed [15]. 
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 If Code Protector detects any of the above constructs in the application being 
protected, the application is not fully protected.  In this case, a warning is given to the 
user indicating both the reason for failure and the offending function that violated one of 
the above conditions. 
 
 4.2.3. Test Application. FractalAttack is designed to allow easy generation 
of fractals by users.  FractalAttack uses a Windows Form (a .NET GUI object).  The 
primary GUI window is the central control structure, with several buttons, drop-down 
boxes, and text fields that control the options that control the fractal generation process.  
The actual calculation of the fractal is done by iteratively constructing the fractal, then 
performing the graphical rendering of the fractal to a displayable image.  The fractal 
generation process first calculates the fractal in a string representation (using a sequence 
of line turns to specify the fractal) then generates the fractal in two-dimensional array 
space, and finally renders the fractal by converting it to an appropriately scaled bitmap 
image. 
 FractalAttack is compiled as a single executable file.  The entire program was 
written in the C# programming language so that it is composed entirely of .NET code.  
The application is dependent on several libraries that are present in the .NET framework 
(e.g. Windows Forms and Bitmap image handling). 
 
 4.2.4. Test Application Protection. Some of the more complex functions in 
FractalAttack are modified to support Code Protector’s requirements (e.g. “ref” 
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parameters had to be replaced with by-value passing) for the IP protection test.  The 
modified methods are the orientation calculation and input validation. 
 While Code Protector does appear to have several configurable options for 
protecting applications, the interaction between the various options causes all but a few of 
the configurations to be largely ineffective.  Aside from normal configuration options, 
such as the .NET version of the executable, Code Protector has four specific protection 
options which can each be set to either “True” or “False.”  These options are Cloak 
Method Calls, Cross-Assembly Calls Cloaking, Drop Metadata, and Enable Code 
Transformation.  Cloak Method Calls and Cross-Assembly Calls Cloaking prevent 
viewing of calls between protected methods within the same binary and calls between 
protected methods in other binaries, respectively.  Drop Metadata is supposed to prevent 
the easy reconstruction of symbolic information in the original source code by removing 
that data from the CLR stack.  All tests performed by the researcher revealed that there 
was always some metadata, such as the function names or the number and type of input 
parameters, visible even after applying this protection.  Finally, Enable Code 
Transformation is required for Code Protector to edit the application binary and add calls 
to the SVM, so this choice is necessary for maximum protection.  Through experience, it 
was found that maximum protection can only be achieved by setting each option in Code 
Protector to “True.”  As such, this practice was used throughout the protection tests [15]. 
 
 4.2.5. Attack Analysis. All attempts to break into the SVM and completely 
remove the obfuscation from the protected methods to observe or modify application 
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execution were unsuccessful.  Attacks on the protected application are therefore limited 
to using commonly-available reversing tools to attempt to gain as much information from 
the protected application as possible.  After repeated attempts to break the application's 
protections, there seem to be no viable attack methods using the available reversing tools.  
Thus, breaking the protections that are applied to the test application is beyond the scope 
of this research. 
 .NET Reflector and OllyDbg are the most helpful tools in determining what 
occurs in the methods protected by code protector.  While the method names, arguments 
and types, and direct SVM calls are visible, direct manipulation of the input data values 
for the purpose of tampering with the values contained in the protected executable is only 
possible by editing the calling method’s string before it is passed to the protected method. 
 Using a combination of the .NET Reflector debugger plugin “Deblector” (a 
combination of “Debugger” and “Reflector”) and OllyDbg to view the protected 
application as it executes, the calls to the SVM in the generated DLLs are visible only on 
a sporadic basis.  Possibly due to some unknown anti-debugging measure or possibly due 
to the multi-threaded nature of the application, debugging the executable makes it 
unstable and typically causes program failure. 
4.3 Quantitative Analysis of Performance Impacts 
 4.3.1. Static Analysis of Protected Binaries. The protection does not appear to 
significantly alter the target application’s performance, although protecting a more 
computationally-intensive method results in significant performance decreases for the 
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protected application (in fact, Microsoft’s documentation suggests that frequently-used 
methods are poor candidates for protection due to performance issues).  
 The executable size difference between the protected and unprotected application 
binary is negligible because Code Protector simply replaces the protected functions’ 
instructions with calls to the SVM and setup information.  Both the looping and single-
use orientation method versions of the protected application are approximately 36KB, 
while both versions of the unprotected application are approximately 32KB.   
 These observations, along with analysis of the protected application source, 
suggest that the protection system strips the functionality out of methods that are marked 
for protection and replaces them with calls to the protected Microsoft Secure Virtual 
Machine (SVM).  Analysis of the protected application binary using .NET Reflector 
confirms this hypothesis in Section 4.2 above. 
 
 4.3.2. Dynamic Analysis of Protected Binaries. There is no human-
observable impact on runtime length or responsiveness between the protected and 
unprotected versions of the target application.  Therefore, the test application uses the 
difference between the system time immediately upon the entry into the 
displayHeighwayDragon method (displayed below in Appendix A) and the system time 
immediately before the return from the same method to determine the execution length of 
that method in milliseconds.  Metrics gathered from comparisons of the protected 
application versus the unprotected application are described below. 
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 Testing of application runtimes is divided into four categories: the unprotected 
test application runtimes; the protected test application runtimes; the unprotected test 
application with orientation calculations at each new line decision iteration; and the 
protected test application with orientation calculations at each line decision iteration.  The 
first two categories are runtimes from the protected and unprotected versions of the test 
application with SLPS protections applied only to a single method (the orientation 
computation method, which is called only once during fractal generation).  The third and 
fourth categories are runtimes from the protected and unprotected versions of the test 
application with SLPS protections applied to a modified computeOrientation method that 
is invoked at each line turn decision in the fractal computation (8191 calls for the degree 
12 fractal used in testing).  Thirty (30) runtime values (in milliseconds) are recorded for 
each of the four versions of the test application.  Each runtime is recorded from a fresh 
restart of the test application and is measured from a calculation and display of a 
Heighway-Dragon fractal of degree 12 oriented at pi/2. 
 Descriptive statistics and histogram plots for the runtime metrics for the single-
function protected versus unprotected applications are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.  The 
unprotected application shows consistently faster runtimes, and the 2-sample t-test shown 
in Figure 4.3 indicates that the difference between the two means is statistically 
significant due to a p-value of less than 0.001. 
 
 
35 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Statistics and Histogram for Protected Application Runtimes 
 
The observed dynamic behavior of the unprotected and protected executables 
suggests that protected single-use functions do not significantly affect the performance of 
the application.  While the two sample means are statistically different, the protected 
application mean is 885.9 ms slower than the unprotected application mean.  This 34.1% 
increase in speed is tolerable if the protected application provides protection of the 
application’s intellectual property. 
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Figure 4.2. Statistics and Histogram for Unprotected Application Runtimes 
 
Two-Sample T-Test and CI: Unprotected, Protected 
 
Two-sample T for Unprotected vs Protected 
 
N    Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Unprotected  30  2599.5   45.0      8.2 
Protected    30  3485.4   76.1       14 
 
 
Difference = mu (Unprotected) - mu (Protected) 
Estimate for difference:  -885.9 
95% CI for difference:  (-918.4, -853.4) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -54.86   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 47 
 
Figure 4.3. MINITAB Output for 2-Sample T-Test of Unprotected versus Protected 
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Figure 4.4. Statistics and Histograms for Protected Looping Application Runtimes 
 
However, if a new computeOrientation method is applied within the main fractal 
generation loop (specifically to the line orientation calculation method 
calculateNextHeighwayDragonLine, visible in Appendix A), a protected version of the 
application is significantly slower than the unprotected application.  This is indicated by 
the difference between the sample means as shown by a 2-sample t-test with a p-value of 
less than 0.001.  Descriptive statistics and histogram plots for the runtime metrics for the 
single-function protected versus unprotected applications are shown in Figures 4.4 and 
4.5.  The MINITAB data is shown below in Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.5. Statistics and Histograms for Unprotected Looping Application Runtimes 
 
 
Two-Sample T-Test and CI: Unprotected Looping, Protected Looping  
 
Two-sample T for Unprotected Looping vs Protected Looping 
 
                      N    Mean  StDev  SE Mean 
Unprotected Looping  30  2588.1   49.9      9.1 
Protected Looping    30  9003.1   70.3       13 
 
 
Difference = mu (Unprotected Looping) - mu (Protected Looping) 
Estimate for difference:  -6415.0 
95% CI for difference:  (-6446.6, -6383.4) 
T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -407.54   
P-Value = 0.000  DF = 52 
 
 
Figure 4.6. MINITAB Output for 2-Sample T-Test of Looping Applications 
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Because the two sample means for the looping test applications are statistically 
different, the large magnitude of the difference between the protected and unprotected 
runtime means indicates a significant slowdown (6415 ms) when the SLPS protections 
are applied to a high-use program method.  The unprotected looping application executes 
in only 28.75% of the time required for the protected looping application to execute.  The 
protected application experiences slightly higher system memory usage than the 
unprotected application, and this fact is attributed to the extra DLLs that are loaded and 
called in order for the application to utilize the SVM.  Usage of the protected application 
is identical to the unprotected application, so long as the .NET framework is installed on 
the system and the DLLs that are created by Code Protector are included with the 
application. 
 
4.4 Summary of Results and Analysis 
Code Protector is a viable solution to mitigate the inherent openness of .NET 
applications’ source.  Because the protected application must still run atop the CLR, the 
executed instructions are still visible at some level, despite the obfuscation protecting 
them.  However, commonly-available reversing tools are not sufficient to defeat the 
protections applied to the target application by Code Protector for the purpose of reverse 
engineering protected algorithms or tampering with program data. 
Microsoft warns that Code Protector should not be used to secure methods that 
are frequently used or that take up a large amount of processing time due to the 
performance impact.  While the first test application used for this evaluation was not 
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affected by this problem, it is problematic if the IP of an application resides in a method 
that is invoked frequently or consumes a great deal of processing time.  This performance 
slowdown is confirmed by a modified test application which contains repeated calls to 
the protected methods when compared to the performance of an application that only 
calls the protected method once.
 
V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Overview 
 This chapter presents an overview of the conclusions of this research and the 
results of each of this research's goals.  This chapter also describes new areas of research 
and research that can be directly extended from this current effort. 
 
5.2 Summary of Research Goals 
 5.2.1. Develop Test Application and Apply Software Protection. This research 
presents a test .NET application that has selected methods protected using the software 
protection scheme being tested.  The application consists of a multi-threaded interface 
and contains scientific calculations suitable for simulating intellectual property that is in 
need of protection from tampering or reverse engineering.  The interface is simple and 
easy to use, and it produces graphical feedback to indicate successful completion. 
 SLPS is used to apply protections to this application in a logical configuration to 
two different methods within the application.  A simulated tampering objective is present 
within the first protected method and a decision algorithm is present within the second 
method.  These protected methods are the targets for the red team analysis portion of this 
research. 
 
 5.2.2. Perform “Red Team” Analysis. The protections applied to the test 
application are evaluated using commonly-available reversing tools.  The protections 
were effective in preventing tampering and reverse engineering efforts by the researcher 
42 
 
using OllyDbg, IDAPro, and .NET Reflector.  Debugging the protected executable is 
complicated by the multi-threaded nature of the test application, but any observation of 
the visible execution of the SVM itself does not yield successful results in reversing the 
protected algorithm.  While it is possible to tamper with the input parameters to the 
methods which contain the tamper and reversing targets, no tampering with the method 
itself is possible. 
 
 5.2.3. Analyze Attack Results and Application Performance. No effective 
tampering or reverse engineering attacks were conducted against the protections applied 
to the test application, although the structure of the Microsoft SVM and SLPS protection 
libraries is visible through careful examination of the method calls and DLLs generated 
by Code Protector.  The multi-threaded nature of the application makes analysis difficult, 
but even when the protected application was debugged using its originating development 
environment, no useful observation of the SVM's operations occurred. 
 Microsoft cautions developers against using its protection methods on methods 
that are repeatedly called or consume large amounts of the application's overall execution 
time [15, 16].  This claim was verified through comparison of repeated calls to a 
protected method versus an identical unprotected method within the test application.  
However, as demonstrated by the orientation decision method of the protected test 
application, single-use methods do not significantly impact the performance of protected 
applications versus identical unprotected applications. 
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5.3 Future Research 
 Virtualization is a well established technology in computing, but the use of 
virtualization as a software protection is a relatively new idea that has not been widely 
examined in scholarly literature.  A valuable research effort could be to formalize the 
definition of virtualized software protections and analyze the inherent vulnerabilities 
present in that class of software protections.  Additionally, formal methods for creating 
virtual protections would be of great value to developers investigating the creation of a 
software protection application. 
 While this research was unsuccessful in subverting the protections applied by the 
SLPS to the test application, further efforts could be made to attack the virtual protection 
scheme offered by Code Protector using automated tools or different reversing methods.  
More generally, other virtual software protections could be attacked and analyzed in a 
similar manner to identify other viable virtualized protections or potentially vulnerable 
protection schemes. 
As with most topics in the realm of software protection, it is difficult to define 
metrics that accurately capture the degree of protection offered by a specific form of 
software protection.  This research defines performance metrics as a means of evaluating 
the suitability of an application for protection by Code Protector, but other metrics would 
be useful in evaluating the effectiveness of individual protections or classes of software 
protections. 
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5.4. Summary 
This research demonstrates that the protections applied to .NET application code 
by the Microsoft SLPS are an effective means of mitigating the inherent openness of 
.NET application binaries.  While there are some prohibitive restrictions as to what types 
of .NET libraries and language constructs may be used in applications which are 
protected by SLPS, the test application is able to work around these limitations in order to 
conform to the constraints and ensure correct protection of the application.  Application 
performance is a concern with the SLPS in cases where protected methods are repeatedly 
invoked or consume a great deal of the application's overall processing time as there is 
considerable overhead involved with executing a method within the SVM. 
Code Protector is certainly a useful tool for protecting applications against 
reversers having moderate reversing experience/skill.  While it seems plausible that 
automated tools or skilled adversaries could defeat the virtualized protections of the 
SLPS, it is a difficult and tedious undertaking to attack the application “by hand” using 
only commonly-available reversing tools.  This makes Code Protector a viable way to 
secure intellectual property within certain .NET applications against tampering and 
reversing.
 
Appendix A. Complete Test Application Source Code 
Program.cs (top level main file) 
//all code written by Matthew Zimmerman 
 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.Windows.Forms; 
 
//top level class to control program start 
namespace FractalAttackGUI { 
   static class Program { 
      /// <summary> 
      /// The main entry point for the application. 
      /// </summary> 
      [STAThread] 
      static void Main() { 
         Application.EnableVisualStyles(); 
         Application.SetCompatibleTextRenderingDefault(false); 
         Application.Run(new FractalAattackGUII()); 
      } 
   } 
} 
FractalAttackGUI.cs (GUI frame and main generation methods) 
//all code written by Matthew Zimmerman 
 
using System; 
using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.ComponentModel; 
using System.Data; 
using System.Drawing; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Windows.Forms; 
 
namespace FractalAttackGUI { 
   public class FractalAattackGUII : Form { 
      //class constants 
      public const String VERSION = "1.0"; 
      public const int GUI_MAX_ITERATIONS_CENTERED = 10; 
 
      //selection codes 
      public const int INVALID = 0; 
      public const int HEIGHWAY_DRAGON = 1; 
      public const int EXIT = 2; 
 
      //display methods 
      public const int CONSOLE = 1; 
      public const int FLAT_FILE = 2; 
      public const int BITMAP_FILE = 3; 
 
      //ASCII text constants 
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      public const int SPACE = 0; 
      public const int V_LINE = 1; 
      public const int H_LINE = 2; 
      public const char VERTICAL_LINE = '|'; 
      public const char HORIZONTAL_LINE = '_'; 
      public const char WHITESPACE = ' '; 
 
      //sequence information 
      public const char RIGHT = 'R'; 
      public const char LEFT = 'L'; 
 
      //orientation constants 
      public const int NORTH = 1; 
      public const int SOUTH = 2; 
      public const int EAST = 3; 
      public const int WEST = 4; 
 
      //fractal generation constants 
      public const int CALCULATE_FOLDS = 1; 
      public const int GENERATE_BITMAP = 2; 
      public const int RENDER_FRACTAL = 3; 
 
      //HD console display limitations 
      public const int HEIGHWAY_DRAGON_CONSOLE_LIMIT = 10; 
      public const int HEIGHWAY_DRAGON_LARGE_WARNING = 16; 
      public const int HEIGHWAY_DRAGON_HUGE_WARNING = 30; 
 
      //HD output file options 
      public const string CURRENT_DIRECTORY = "./"; 
      public const string FLAT_FILE_NAME = "HD_FF_"; 
      public const string FLAT_FILE_EXTENSION = ".dat"; 
      public const string BITMAP_NAME = "HD_PIC_"; 
      public const string BITMAP_EXTENSION = ".bmp"; 
 
      //bitmap display array values 
      public const int EMPTY_SPACE = 0; 
      public const int LINE = 1; 
      public const int GRADIENT = 2; 
 
      //bitmap drawing values 
      public const int VERTICAL = 0; 
      public const int HORIZONTAL = 1; 
      public const int CORNER = 2; 
 
      //UI preferences 
      public const int SCALING = 3; 
      public const int WAIT_TIME = 2000; 
 
      //GUI components 
      ComboBox fractalChooser; 
      Panel optionsPanel; 
      Label optionsLabel; 
      Label typeLabel; 
      Label orientationLabel; 
      Label iterationsLabel; 
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      Label progressBarLabel; 
      Button generateFractalButton; 
      TextBox iterations; 
      ComboBox orientationChooser; 
      Panel displayPanel; 
      MainMenu menu; 
      MenuItem fileMenu; 
      MenuItem fileSaveFractal; 
      MenuItem fileExitProgram; 
      MenuItem aboutMenu; 
      MenuItem aboutHelpMenuItem; 
      MenuItem aboutInformationMenuItem; 
      StatusBar status; 
      StatusBarPanel messages; 
      ContinuousProgressBar progressDisplay; 
      BackgroundWorker threadedGeneration; 
 
      //threading shared variables 
      static bool fractalGenerated; 
      static bool generationInProgress; 
      static int fractal_stage; 
      static int fractal_progress; 
      static int fractal_orientation; 
      static long fractal_iterations; 
      static int fractal_type; 
      static Bitmap fractal_picture; 
 
      //top-level initialization control 
      public FractalAattackGUII() { 
         InitializeGUIComponents(); 
         displayMessage("Welcome to Fractal Attack!"); 
          
         //set Booleans for threaded generation 
         fractalGenerated = false; 
         generationInProgress = false; 
         fractal_progress = 0; 
         fractal_stage = CALCULATE_FOLDS; 
      } 
 
//setup GUI objects for the primary application window 
      private void InitializeGUIComponents() { 
         this.SuspendLayout(); 
         this.AutoScaleDimensions = new System.Drawing.SizeF(8F, 16F); 
         this.AutoScaleMode = System.Windows.Forms.AutoScaleMode.Font; 
         this.AutoSize = true; 
         this.ClientSize = new System.Drawing.Size(550, 475); 
         this.MaximumSize = new System.Drawing.Size(550, 475); 
         this.MinimumSize = new System.Drawing.Size(550, 475); 
         this.StartPosition = FormStartPosition.CenterScreen; 
         this.Margin = new System.Windows.Forms.Padding(4); 
         this.Font = new System.Drawing.Font("Verdana", 9.75F,   
                            System.Drawing.FontStyle.Regular,         
                            System.Drawing.GraphicsUnit.Point,  
                            ( (byte) ( 0 ) )); 
         try { 
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            this.Icon = Icon.ExtractAssociatedIcon("icon.bmp"); 
         } catch ( ArgumentException ){ 
            this.Icon = null; 
         } 
         this.Name = "FractalAattackGUI"; 
         this.Text = "Fractal Attack v " + VERSION; 
 
         //menu objects 
         menu = new MainMenu(); 
         fileMenu = new MenuItem("&File"); 
         fileSaveFractal = new MenuItem("&Save Fractal",  
                                   new System.EventHandler(   
                              this.fileSaveFractalMenuItem_Click),   
                                   Shortcut.CtrlS); 
         fileExitProgram = new MenuItem("E&xit", 
            new System.EventHandler(this.fileExitMenuItem_Click),   
            Shortcut.CtrlX); 
         fileMenu.MenuItems.Add(fileSaveFractal); 
         fileMenu.MenuItems.Add("-"); 
         fileMenu.MenuItems.Add(fileExitProgram); 
         menu.MenuItems.Add(fileMenu); 
         aboutMenu = new MenuItem("&About"); 
         aboutHelpMenuItem = new MenuItem("&Help", new  
            System.EventHandler(this.aboutHelpMenuItem_Click)); 
         aboutInformationMenuItem = new MenuItem("&Information", new  
            System.EventHandler(this.aboutInformationMenuItem_Click)); 
         aboutMenu.MenuItems.Add(aboutHelpMenuItem); 
         aboutMenu.MenuItems.Add(aboutInformationMenuItem); 
         menu.MenuItems.Add(aboutMenu); 
         this.Menu = menu; 
          
    //GUI objects (text boxes, drop down boxes, etc.) 
   status = new StatusBar(); 
         messages = new StatusBarPanel(); 
         messages.BorderStyle = StatusBarPanelBorderStyle.Raised; 
         messages.AutoSize = StatusBarPanelAutoSize.Spring; 
         status.Panels.Add(messages); 
         status.ShowPanels = true; 
         this.Controls.Add(status); 
          
         optionsLabel = new Label(); 
         optionsLabel.Text = "Options:"; 
         optionsLabel.SetBounds(0, 0, 70, 20); 
         optionsLabel.TextAlign = ContentAlignment.TopLeft; 
          
         typeLabel = new Label(); 
         typeLabel.Text = "Fractal Type"; 
         typeLabel.SetBounds(75, 0, 100, 20); 
         typeLabel.TextAlign = ContentAlignment.TopLeft; 
         String[] fractals = { "<Select Fractal>", "Heighway-Dragon" }; 
         fractalChooser = new ComboBox(); 
         fractalChooser.DataSource = fractals; 
         fractalChooser.DropDownStyle = ComboBoxStyle.DropDownList; 
         fractalChooser.SetBounds(75, 20, 150, 30); 
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         iterationsLabel = new Label(); 
         iterationsLabel.Text = "Iterations"; 
         iterationsLabel.SetBounds(240, 0, 75, 20); 
         iterationsLabel.TextAlign = ContentAlignment.TopLeft; 
         iterations = new TextBox(); 
         iterations.SetBounds(240, 20, 75, 30); 
         iterations.Multiline = false; 
         iterations.ReadOnly = false; 
         iterations.TextChanged += new  
            System.EventHandler(this.iterationsTextBox_TextChanged); 
          
         orientationLabel = new Label(); 
         orientationLabel.Text = "Orientation"; 
         orientationLabel.SetBounds(325, 0, 100, 20); 
         orientationLabel.TextAlign = ContentAlignment.TopLeft; 
         orientationChooser = new ComboBox(); 
         String[] orienationChoices = { "<Direction>", "Pi/2 (Up)",  
                                        "2Pi (Right)", "3pi/4 (Down)" ,  
                                        "Pi (Left)" }; 
         orientationChooser.DataSource = orienationChoices; 
         orientationChooser.SetBounds(325, 20, 100, 20); 
         orientationChooser.DropDownStyle = ComboBoxStyle.DropDownList; 
         generateFractalButton = new Button(); 
         generateFractalButton.SetBounds(440, 12, 80, 25); 
         generateFractalButton.Text = "Generate"; 
         generateFractalButton.Click += new  
            System.EventHandler(this.generateFractalButton_Click); 
 
         optionsPanel = new Panel(); 
         optionsPanel.SetBounds(5, 5, 531, 50); 
         optionsPanel.BorderStyle = BorderStyle.Fixed3D; 
         optionsPanel.Controls.Add(optionsLabel); 
         optionsPanel.Controls.Add(fractalChooser); 
         optionsPanel.Controls.Add(typeLabel); 
         optionsPanel.Controls.Add(iterationsLabel); 
         optionsPanel.Controls.Add(iterations); 
         optionsPanel.Controls.Add(orientationLabel); 
         optionsPanel.Controls.Add(orientationChooser); 
         optionsPanel.Controls.Add(generateFractalButton); 
         this.Controls.Add(optionsPanel); 
 
         displayPanel = new Panel(); 
 
         progressDisplay = new ContinuousProgressBar(); 
         progressDisplay.SetBounds(65, 151, 400, 30); 
         progressDisplay.Visible = false; 
         progressDisplay.Value = 0; 
         displayPanel.Controls.Add(progressDisplay); 
 
         progressBarLabel = new Label(); 
         progressBarLabel.SetBounds(65, 131, 400, 20); 
         progressBarLabel.BackColor = Color.White; 
         progressBarLabel.TextAlign = ContentAlignment.TopCenter; 
         progressBarLabel.Visible = false; 
         displayPanel.Controls.Add(progressBarLabel); 
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         displayPanel.SetBounds(5, 60, 531, 332); 
         displayPanel.BorderStyle = BorderStyle.Fixed3D; 
         displayPanel.BackColor = Color.White; 
         this.Controls.Add(displayPanel); 
 
         threadedGeneration = new BackgroundWorker(); 
         threadedGeneration.WorkerReportsProgress = true; 
         threadedGeneration.WorkerSupportsCancellation = false; 
         threadedGeneration.ProgressChanged += new  
            ProgressChangedEventHandler(   
               threadedGeneration_ProgressChanged); 
         threadedGeneration.DoWork += new  
            DoWorkEventHandler(threadedGeneration_DoWork); 
         this.ResumeLayout(false); 
      } 
 
      //message utility function for status bar update 
      private void displayMessage( String message ) { 
         if ( message != null ) { 
            messages.Text = message; 
         } 
      } 
 
      //menu listener for the “Save” command 
      private void fileSaveFractalMenuItem_Click( Object sender,  
                                                  EventArgs e ) { 
         if ( fractalGenerated ) { 
            int fileNumber = 0; 
            System.IO.Directory.SetCurrentDirectory(CURRENT_DIRECTORY); 
            for ( int i = 0; i < System.IO.Directory.GetFiles(   
                  CURRENT_DIRECTORY).Length; i++ ) { 
               if ( System.IO.File.Exists( BITMAP_NAME + fileNumber +  
                    BITMAP_EXTENSION ) ) { 
                  fileNumber++; 
               } 
            } 
 
            displayPanel.BackgroundImage.Save(CURRENT_DIRECTORY +  
                                              BITMAP_NAME +  
                                              fileNumber +   
                                              BITMAP_EXTENSION,  
               System.Drawing.Imaging.ImageFormat.Bmp); 
            displayMessage("Fractal saved as " + BITMAP_NAME +  
                            fileNumber + BITMAP_EXTENSION); 
         } else { 
            displayMessage("No fractal has been generated, no file will  
                            be saved."); 
         } 
      } 
 
      //menu “Exit” option action 
      private void fileExitMenuItem_Click( Object sender,  
                                           EventArgs e ) { 
         fractalGenerated = false; 
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         Application.Exit(); 
      } 
 
      //menu “Help” option action 
      private void aboutHelpMenuItem_Click( Object sender,  
                                            EventArgs e ) { 
         MessageBox.Show(this, "If you need help figuring out how to  
                                operate this application, you need more   
                                help that I can offer.",  
                         "Fractal Attack Help", MessageBoxButtons.OK,  
                         MessageBoxIcon.Question);    
      } 
 
      //menu “Info” option action 
      private void aboutInformationMenuItem_Click( Object sender,  
                                                   EventArgs e ) { 
         MessageBox.Show(this, "Fractal Attack v " + VERSION + "\nThe  
                                Premier .NET Fractal Generation  
                                Application\nDeveloped by AFRL/RYTA  
                                ATSPI Office\n\nDevelopers\nMatt  
                                Zimmerman",  
                         "Fractal Attack Information",  
                         MessageBoxButtons.OK,  
                         MessageBoxIcon.Information); 
      } 
 
      //listener action to do validation of the number of iterations 
      private void iterationsTextBox_TextChanged( Object sender,  
                                                  EventArgs e ) { 
         long value = 0; 
         if ( !Int64.TryParse(iterations.Text, out value) ||  
              iterations.Text.Contains(".")){ 
            iterations.Text = ""; 
            displayMessage("Please enter an integer value for  
                            iterations."); 
         } 
      } 
 
      //reversing target function, uses arbitrary computations to 
      //determine a starting location 
      public static int computeOrientation( int orientation,  
                                            int numIterations,  
                                            int type ){ 
       long temp = System.DateTime.Now.Ticks;  //current system time 
         int key1 = 0; 
         int key2 = 0; 
         int result = 0; 
         key1 = (int)(temp * orientation ); 
         key2 = (int)(temp / numIterations ); 
         result = Math.Abs(( key1 + key2 ) % 4 + 1); //absolute value 
       if ( result < 1 )  
            result = 1; 
         if ( result > 4 )  
            result = 4; 
         if ( orientation == 1 )  
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            return 1;  // pi/2 input will ALWAYS be up 
         return result; 
      } 
 
      //top level method to control fractal generation and display 
      private void displayHeighwayDragon( int startOrientation,  
                                          long iterations) { 
            //method variables 
            int orientation = startOrientation; 
            int right = 0; 
            int left = 0; 
            int up = 0; 
            int down = 0; 
            int max_right = 0; 
            int max_left = 0; 
            int max_up = 0; 
            int max_down = 0; 
            int startRow, startColumn, previousColumn, previousRow; 
           
            //setup the render to start displaying 
            generationInProgress = true; 
            fractal_progress = 0; 
            fractal_stage = CALCULATE_FOLDS; 
            threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress); 
 
            //construct the string that contains the sequence of turns 
            string sequence = ""; 
            string temp = ""; 
            for ( int i = 0; i < iterations; i++ ) { 
                fractal_progress = (int) ( ( (double) i / iterations )  
                                      * 100 ); 
                threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress); 
                //flip the previous sequence 
                temp = ""; 
                for ( int j = sequence.Length - 1; j >= 0; j-- ){ 
                    if ( sequence[j].CompareTo(RIGHT) == 0 ) { 
                        temp += LEFT; 
                    } else { 
                        temp += RIGHT; 
                    } 
                } 
                //add "R" to the sequence and append the flipped  
                //previous sequence 
                sequence += RIGHT; 
                sequence += temp; 
            } 
             
            //update the progress display 
            fractal_progress = 100; 
            threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress); 
            System.Threading.Thread.Sleep(1000); 
            //switch to bitmap generation 
            fractal_stage = GENERATE_BITMAP; 
            fractal_progress = 0; 
            threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress); 
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            //determine the limits of the fractal curve 
            for ( int i = 0; i < sequence.Length; i++ ){ 
                fractal_progress = (int) ( ( (double) i /  
                                           sequence.Length ) * 100 ); 
                threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress); 
                calculateNextHeighwayDragonLine(sequence, i, ref  
                                                orientation,  
                                                ref up, ref down, ref  
                                                right, ref left); 
                //adjust maximum observed values if necessary 
                if ( down > max_down ) max_down = down; 
                if ( up > max_up ) max_up = up; 
                if ( right > max_right ) max_right = right; 
                if ( left > max_left ) max_left = left; 
            } 
 
            //additional variables 
            int height = 0; 
            int width = 0; 
            int[][] fractal = null; 
 
            //find bounding values for fractal size calculation 
            height = max_up + max_down + 1; 
            width = max_left + max_right + 1; 
            fractal = new int[height * SCALING][]; 
            for ( int i = 0; i < height * SCALING; i++ ) { 
               fractal[i] = new int[width * SCALING]; 
               for ( int j = 0; j < width * SCALING; j++ ) { 
                  fractal[i][j] = EMPTY_SPACE; 
               } 
            } 
             
            //save position values of the starting point 
            startRow    = max_up; 
            startColumn = max_left; 
            up = down = left = right = 0; 
            orientation = startOrientation; 
 
            //draw the fractal curve one line at a time 
            //the drawLine method will update the fractal 2d array 
            int previousOrientation; 
            if ( orientation == NORTH || orientation == SOUTH ) { 
               drawLine(ref fractal, startRow, startColumn,  
                        VERTICAL); 
               previousOrientation = VERTICAL; 
            } 
            else { 
               drawLine(ref fractal, startRow, startColumn,  
                        HORIZONTAL); 
               previousOrientation = HORIZONTAL; 
            } 
                   
            previousColumn = startColumn; 
            previousRow = startRow; 
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            int previousProgress = fractal_progress; 
 
            for ( int i = 0; i < sequence.Length; i++ ) { 
               fractal_progress = (int) ( ((double) i /  
                                          sequence.Length ) * 100 ); 
                  if ( fractal_progress != previousProgress ){ 
                    threadedGeneration.ReportProgress( 
                           fractal_progress); 
                        previousProgress = fractal_progress; 
                  } 
                  calculateNextHeighwayDragonLine(sequence, i, ref  
                                                  orientation, 
                                                  ref up, ref down,  
                                                  ref right,  
                                                  ref left); 
                  if ( orientation == NORTH ||  
                       orientation == SOUTH ) { 
                     drawLine(ref fractal, startRow + down - up,  
                              startColumn + right - left, VERTICAL); 
                     drawCorner(ref fractal, previousOrientation,  
                                previousRow, previousColumn, 
                                VERTICAL, startRow + down - up,  
                                startColumn + right - left); 
                     previousOrientation = VERTICAL; 
                  } else if ( orientation == EAST ||  
                              orientation == WEST ) { 
                     drawLine(ref fractal, startRow + down - up,  
                              startColumn + right - left,  
                              HORIZONTAL); 
                     drawCorner(ref fractal, previousOrientation,  
                                previousRow, previousColumn, 
                                HORIZONTAL, startRow + down - up,  
                                startColumn + right - left); 
                     previousOrientation = HORIZONTAL; 
                  } 
                  previousColumn = startColumn + right - left; 
                     previousRow = startRow + down - up; 
                 } 
                  
                 //update progress bar 
                 fractal_progress = 100; 
                 threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress); 
                 System.Threading.Thread.Sleep(1000); 
                 fractal_stage = RENDER_FRACTAL; 
                 fractal_progress = 0;         
                 threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress); 
 
                 //display the fractal by populating a bitmap with 
                 //the appropriate pixel array data 
                 System.Drawing.Bitmap picture = null; 
 
                 if ( fractal.Length > 0 ) { 
                    picture = new System.Drawing.Bitmap(  
                                     fractal[0].Length,   
                                     fractal.Length); 
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                    for ( int i = 0; i < picture.Height; i++ ) { 
                       fractal_progress = (int) ( ( (double) i /  
                                             fractal.Length ) * 100 ); 
                       if ( fractal_progress !=  
                            progressDisplay.Value ) { 
                          threadedGeneration.ReportProgress( 
                             fractal_progress); 
                       } 
                       for ( int j = 0; j < picture.Width; j++ ) { 
                          if ( fractal[i][j] == LINE ) { 
                             picture.SetPixel(j, i,  
                                System.Drawing.Color.RoyalBlue); 
                          } else if ( fractal[i][j] == EMPTY_SPACE ) { 
                             picture.SetPixel(j, i,  
                                System.Drawing.Color.White); 
                          } else if ( fractal[i][j] == GRADIENT ) { 
                             picture.SetPixel(j, i,  
                                System.Drawing.Color.PowderBlue); 
                          } 
                       } 
 
                    } 
                 } 
 
                 //setup the render to start displaying 
                 fractal_picture = picture; 
                 generationInProgress = false; 
                 fractal_progress = 100; 
                 threadedGeneration.ReportProgress(fractal_progress); 
                 System.Threading.Thread.Sleep(1000); 
        } 
 
 
        //draw a corner between two lines (purely for visual appeal) 
        private static void drawCorner( ref int[][] fractal,  
                                        int previousOrientation,  
                                        int previousRow,  
                                        int previousColumn, 
                                        int orientation, int row,  
                                        int column ) { 
           //corner north-east 
           if ( previousOrientation == VERTICAL &&  
                previousColumn < column && previousRow > row ) { 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 - 1][previousColumn * 3 + 1] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 - 2][previousColumn * 3 + 1] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 - 2][previousColumn * 3 + 2] =  
                 LINE; 
 
              //fill the other cells with gradient shading 
              for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) { 
                 for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) { 
                    if ( fractal[( previousRow - 1 ) * 3 + i][(  
                         previousColumn ) * 3 + j] != LINE ) { 
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                       fractal[( previousRow - 1 ) * 3 + i][(  
                                 previousColumn ) * 3 + j] = GRADIENT; 
                    } 
                 } 
              } 
           } 
 
           //corner south-east 
           else if ( previousOrientation == VERTICAL &&  
                     previousColumn < column && previousRow < row ) { 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 3][previousColumn * 3 + 1] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 4][previousColumn * 3 + 1] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 4][previousColumn * 3 + 2] =  
                 LINE; 
              //fill the other cells with gradient shading 
              for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) { 
                 for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) { 
                    if ( fractal[( previousRow + 1 ) * 3 + i][(  
                                   previousColumn ) * 3 + j] != LINE )  
                    { 
                       fractal[( previousRow + 1 ) * 3 + i][(  
                                 previousColumn ) * 3 + j] = GRADIENT; 
                    } 
                 } 
              } 
           } 
 
           //corner south-west 
           else if ( previousOrientation == VERTICAL &&  
                     previousColumn > column && previousRow < row ) { 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 3][previousColumn * 3 + 1] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 4][previousColumn * 3 + 1] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 4][previousColumn * 3] = LINE; 
               
              //fill the other cells with gradient shading 
              for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) { 
                 for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) { 
                    if ( fractal[( previousRow + 1 ) * 3 + i][(  
                         previousColumn ) * 3 + j] != LINE ) { 
                       fractal[( previousRow + 1 ) * 3 + i][(  
                                 previousColumn ) * 3 + j] = GRADIENT; 
                    } 
                 } 
              } 
           } 
              //corner north-west 
           else if ( previousOrientation == VERTICAL &&  
                     previousColumn > column && previousRow > row ) { 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 - 1][previousColumn * 3 + 1] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 - 2][previousColumn * 3 + 1] =  
57 
 
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 - 2][previousColumn * 3] = LINE; 
              //fill the other cells with gradient shading 
              for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) { 
                 for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) { 
                    if ( fractal[( previousRow - 1 ) * 3 + i][(  
                         previousColumn ) * 3 + j] != LINE ) { 
                       fractal[( previousRow - 1 ) * 3 + i][(  
                                 previousColumn ) * 3 + j] = GRADIENT; 
                    } 
                 } 
              } 
           } 
              //corner east-north 
           else if ( previousOrientation == HORIZONTAL &&  
                     previousColumn < column && previousRow > row ) { 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 + 3] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 + 4] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3][previousColumn * 3 + 4] = LINE; 
              //fill the other cells with gradient shading 
              for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) { 
                 for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) { 
                    if ( fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(  
                         previousColumn + 1 ) * 3 + j] != LINE ) { 
                       fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(  
                               previousColumn + 1 ) * 3 + j] =  
                                GRADIENT; 
                    } 
                 } 
              } 
           } 
              //corner east-south 
           else if ( previousOrientation == HORIZONTAL &&  
                     previousColumn < column && previousRow < row ) { 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 + 3] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 + 4] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 2][previousColumn * 3 + 4] =  
                 LINE; 
              //fill the other cells with gradient shading 
              for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) { 
                 for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) { 
                    if ( fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(  
                         previousColumn + 1 ) * 3 + j] != LINE ) { 
                       fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(  
                       previousColumn + 1 ) * 3 + j] = GRADIENT; 
                    } 
                 } 
              } 
           } 
              //corner west-north 
           else if ( previousOrientation == HORIZONTAL &&  
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                     previousColumn > column && previousRow > row ) { 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 - 1] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 - 2] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3][previousColumn * 3 - 2] = LINE; 
              //fill the other cells with gradient shading 
              for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) { 
                 for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) { 
                    if ( fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(  
                         previousColumn - 1 ) * 3 + j] != LINE ) { 
                       fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(  
                       previousColumn - 1 ) * 3 + j] = GRADIENT; 
                    } 
                 } 
              } 
           } 
              //corner west-south 
           else if ( previousOrientation == HORIZONTAL &&  
                     previousColumn > column && previousRow < row ) { 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 - 1] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 1][previousColumn * 3 - 2] =  
                 LINE; 
              fractal[previousRow * 3 + 2][previousColumn * 3 - 2] =  
                 LINE; 
              //fill the other cells with gradient shading 
              for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) { 
                 for ( int j = 0; j < 3; j++ ) { 
                    if ( fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(  
                         previousColumn - 1 ) * 3 + j] != LINE ) { 
                       fractal[( previousRow ) * 3 + i][(  
                       previousColumn - 1 ) * 3 + j] = GRADIENT; 
                    } 
                 } 
              } 
           } 
        } 
 
        //draw a standard line in the fractal bitmap space 
        private static void drawLine( ref int[][] fractal, int row,  
                                      int column, int orientation ) { 
           if ( orientation == HORIZONTAL ) { 
              for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) { 
                 fractal[row * 3 + 1][column * 3 + i] = LINE; 
                 if ( fractal[row * 3][column * 3 + i] != LINE ) { 
                    fractal[row * 3][column * 3 + i] = GRADIENT; 
                 } 
                 if ( fractal[row * 3 + 2][column * 3 + i] != LINE ) { 
                    fractal[row * 3 + 2][column * 3 + i] = GRADIENT; 
                 } 
              } 
           } else { 
              for ( int i = 0; i < 3; i++ ) { 
                 fractal[row * 3 + i][column * 3 + 1] = LINE; 
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                 if ( fractal[row * 3 + i][column * 3] != LINE ) { 
                    fractal[row * 3 + i][column * 3] = GRADIENT; 
                 } 
                 if ( fractal[row * 3 + i][column * 3 + 2] != LINE ) { 
                    fractal[row * 3 + i][column * 3 + 2] = GRADIENT; 
                 } 
              } 
           } 
        } 
 
        //calculate which way the next line segment will be drawn in an  
        //HD fractal 
        static void calculateNextHeighwayDragonLine( string sequence,  
                                                     int i, 
                                                     ref int  
                                                     orientation, 
                                                     ref int u,  
                                                     ref int d,  
                                                     ref int r,  
                                                     ref int l ) { 
           if ( sequence[i].CompareTo(RIGHT) == 0 ) { 
                    switch ( orientation ) { 
                       case NORTH: 
                          if ( d > 0 ) d--; 
                          else u++; 
                          if ( l > 0 ) l--; 
                          else r++; 
                          orientation = EAST; 
                          break; 
                       case SOUTH: 
                          if ( r > 0 ) r--; 
                          else l++; 
                          if ( u > 0 ) u--; 
                          else d++; 
                          orientation = WEST; 
                          break; 
                       case EAST: 
                          if ( u > 0 ) u--; 
                          else d++; 
                          if ( l > 0 ) l--; 
                          else r++; 
                          orientation = SOUTH; 
                          break; 
                       case WEST: 
                          if ( r > 0 ) r--; 
                          else l++; 
                          if ( d > 0 ) d--; 
                          else u++; 
                          orientation = NORTH; 
                          break; 
                    } 
                 } else if ( sequence[i].CompareTo(LEFT) == 0 ) { 
                    switch ( orientation ) { 
                       case NORTH: 
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                          if ( d > 0 ) d--; 
                          else u++; 
                          if ( r > 0 ) r--; 
                          else l++; 
                          orientation = WEST; 
                          break; 
                       case SOUTH: 
                          if ( l > 0 ) l--; 
                          else r++; 
                          if ( u > 0 ) u--; 
                          else d++; 
                          orientation = EAST; 
                          break; 
                       case EAST: 
                          if ( l > 0 ) l--; 
                          else r++; 
                          if ( d > 0 ) d--; 
                          else u++; 
                          orientation = NORTH; 
                          break; 
                       case WEST: 
                          if ( u > 0 ) u--; 
                          else d++; 
                          if ( r > 0 ) r--; 
                          else l++; 
                          orientation = SOUTH; 
                          break; 
                    } 
                 } 
        } 
 
      //handle progress updates and display on the progress bar 
      private void threadedGeneration_ProgressChanged( Object sender,  
                                                       EventArgs e  ) { 
         switch ( fractal_stage ) { 
            case CALCULATE_FOLDS: 
               progressBarLabel.Text = "Step 1 / 3 Compute Fractal"; 
               break; 
            case GENERATE_BITMAP: 
               progressBarLabel.Text = "Step 2 / 3 Generate Image"; 
               break; 
            case RENDER_FRACTAL: 
               progressBarLabel.Text = "Step 3 / 3 Render Fractal";  
               break; 
         } 
         progressBarLabel.Text += " " + fractal_progress + "%  
                                  Completed"; 
         progressDisplay.Value = fractal_progress; 
 
         if ( fractal_progress == 0 ) { 
            progressBarLabel.Visible = true; 
            progressDisplay.Visible = true; 
         } else if ( fractal_progress == 100 &&  
                     fractal_stage == RENDER_FRACTAL) { 
            progressBarLabel.Visible = false; 
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            progressDisplay.Visible = false; 
 
            if ( fractal_iterations > GUI_MAX_ITERATIONS_CENTERED ) { 
               displayPanel.BackgroundImageLayout = ImageLayout.Zoom; 
            } else { 
               displayPanel.BackgroundImageLayout = ImageLayout.Center; 
            } 
            displayPanel.BackgroundImage = fractal_picture; 
            displayMessage("Fractal generated."); 
            fractalGenerated = true; 
         }  
      } 
 
      //thread invocation that executes the top-level draw method 
      private void threadedGeneration_DoWork( Object sender,  
                                              EventArgs e ) { 
         displayHeighwayDragon(fractal_orientation,  
                               fractal_iterations); 
      } 
 
 
      //button click listen to initiate fractal generation 
      private void generateFractalButton_Click( Object sender,  
                                                EventArgs e ) { 
         int type = 0; 
         int orientation = 0; 
         long numIterations = 0; 
 
         switch ( fractalChooser.SelectedIndex ) { 
            case INVALID: 
               displayMessage("Please select a fractal to generate."); 
               return; 
            case HEIGHWAY_DRAGON: 
               type = fractalChooser.SelectedIndex; 
               break; 
            default: 
               displayMessage("Please select a fractal to generate."); 
               return; 
         } 
         if ( !Int64.TryParse(iterations.Text, out numIterations) ||  
              iterations.Text.Contains(".") || numIterations < 0 ) { 
            displayMessage("Please enter a positive integer value for  
                            iterations."); 
            return; 
         }  
         switch ( orientationChooser.SelectedIndex ) { 
            case INVALID: 
               displayMessage("Please select an orientation for the  
                               fractal."); 
               return; 
            case NORTH: 
            case EAST: 
            case SOUTH: 
            case WEST: 
               orientation = orientationChooser.SelectedIndex; 
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               break; 
            default: 
               displayMessage("Please select an orientation for the  
                               fractal."); 
               return; 
         } 
 
         if ( numIterations > HEIGHWAY_DRAGON_LARGE_WARNING ) { 
            if ( ( MessageBox.Show("Heighway-Dragon fractals of greater  
                                    than degree " +  
                                    HEIGHWAY_DRAGON_LARGE_WARNING +  
                                    " may take a great deal of time to  
                                    compute.  Continue?", "Generate  
                                    Large Fractal?",  
                                    MessageBoxButtons.YesNo,  
                                    MessageBoxIcon.Warning) ) 
                                      .Equals(DialogResult.No) ) { 
               displayMessage("Fractal generation aborted."); 
               return; 
            } 
         } 
         if ( numIterations > HEIGHWAY_DRAGON_HUGE_WARNING ) { 
            if ( ( MessageBox.Show("Honestly, you will probably be dead  
                                    before this fractal completes  
                                    rendering.  REALLY Continue?",  
                                    "Generate Ridiculously-Large  
                                    Fractal?", MessageBoxButtons.YesNo,  
                                    MessageBoxIcon.Warning) ) 
                                      .Equals(DialogResult.No) ) { 
               displayMessage("Fractal generation aborted."); 
               return; 
            } 
         } 
 
         displayMessage("Generating fractal..."); 
 
         switch ( type ){ 
            case HEIGHWAY_DRAGON: 
               if ( generationInProgress ) {  
                  displayMessage("Fractal generation already in  
                                  progress.");  
                  return;  
               } 
               progressBarLabel.Visible = true; 
               progressDisplay.Visible = true; 
               fractal_orientation = orientation; 
               fractal_iterations = numIterations; 
               fractal_type = type; 
               threadedGeneration.RunWorkerAsync(); 
               break; 
         } 
      } 
   } 
 
   //progress bar object 
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   public class ContinuousProgressBar : ProgressBar { 
      public ContinuousProgressBar() { 
         this.Style = ProgressBarStyle.Continuous; 
         this.ForeColor = Color.SteelBlue; 
         this.BackColor = Color.WhiteSmoke; 
      } 
 
      protected override void CreateHandle() { 
         base.CreateHandle(); 
         try { SetWindowTheme(this.Handle, "", ""); }  
         catch { } 
      } 
      [System.Runtime.InteropServices.DllImport("uxtheme.dll")] 
      private static extern int SetWindowTheme(IntPtr hwnd, string  
                                               appname, string idlist); 
   } 
} 
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